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Interpreting the Politics of the Judiciary: The British Senior Judicial 
Tradition and the Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal Justice 
HARRY ANNISON* 
 
This article presents an interpretive politics of the judiciary, arguing for the value of 
interpretive political analysis in understanding developments in case law and judicial 
activity. It sketches out a senior judicial tradition, which is argued to guide but not 
predetermine the actions of the British senior judiciary. A case study, the senior 
judiciary’s response to the Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence, is 
presented which draws on case law, extra-judicial speeches and interviews with five 
relevant serving or retired senior judges. It is argued that this case study 
demonstrates the senior judiciary to be politically attuned actors, often highly 
sensitive to the broader context in which their judgments sit, while equally being 
determined to act with fidelity to the law and the responsibilities inherent in 
membership of an independent, impartial judiciary. In closing, it is argued that the 
IPP case law suggests that the senior judicial tradition, and its inherent tensions, 
limits the extent to which the senior judiciary feel equipped to oppose the ‘pre-
emptive turn’ in criminal justice. 
 
Over the past fifty years, scholars such as John Griffith,
1
 Alan Paterson
2
 and David 
Robertson
3
 have dismantled the longstanding orthodoxy that the judiciary engage in neither 
policymaking nor politics. This article proceeds from an acceptance of Griffith’s central 
claim that judges are political actors, in the sense that as ‘part of the machinery of authority 
within the State...[they] cannot avoid the making of political decisions’.4 Indeed, the case 
study presented below is argued to demonstrate that the British senior judiciary are thoughtful 
participants in British politics, seeking to affect the course taken by criminal justice and 
sentencing policy. 
This article draws upon the work of Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes
5
 to propose an 
interpretive politics of the judiciary; a theoretical and methodological framework which is 
capable of respecting British judges’ genuine fidelity to the law, while recognising their role 
as political actors. Interpretive approaches encourage us to explore the nature and influence 
of meanings, beliefs and practices. We are compelled to take seriously the ways in which 
political actors ‘make sense of their world.’6 
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This article sketches a senior judicial tradition (SJT), ‘a set of theories, stories, and 
associated practices people inherit that then forms the background against which they hold 
beliefs and perform actions’.7 It is argued that this tradition promotes ‘responsible’ behaviour, 
seeking to shore up existing administrative systems and to maintain the standing of the senior 
judiciary.
8
 However, it can be seen to legitimize, to a limited extent, judicial efforts to 
mitigate ‘bad law’.9 While encroachment into the policymaking arena is approached with 
extreme caution,
10
 it is not entirely illegitimate. 
The legal judgments relating to the Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence 
are then explored through this interpretive lens. The coherence of the case law – oriented 
around two central issues and involving the High Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
– is one factor which makes this a valuable case study. A second is the access obtained to 
members of the senior judiciary: this article draws on inter alia interviews conducted with 
five relevant serving or retired senior judges. This case study is argued to show relevant 
members of the senior judiciary to be careful, responsible and reflective political actors. 
The judicial responses to the dilemmas posed by the IPP sentence are explored, and 
the relationship between these responses and the SJT discussed. We see that the judgments 
and other judicial activity were motivated by concerns that the IPP sentence was 
disproportionate, liable to lead to injustice in individual cases and to cause significant 
problems for the penal system. However, as the cases progressed up the judicial hierarchy, 
we see that these concerns became increasingly subsumed by the elements of the SJT 
promoting caution and restraint. 
In closing, these findings are connected to writings on the ‘pre-emptive turn’ in 
criminal justice.
11
  It is argued that the inherent tensions within the SJT – and not least its 
valorisation of stability and restraint – mean that, in a political climate where insecurity and 
risk aversion have become pervasive,
12
 the British senior judiciary stand ill-equipped to 
contest robustly, and in their eyes legitimately, particular instances of this concerning trend. 
 
TOWARDS AN INTERPRETIVE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 
 
We can begin setting out an interpretive politics of the judiciary by noting the points of 
accord and dissonance with three prominent works on senior judicial activity: Paterson’s The 
Law Lords,
13
 Robertson’s Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords14 and Griffith’s The 
Politics of the Judiciary.
15
 These valuable works have contributed to an increasing 
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acceptance that ‘judges are active policy-makers’;16 as Gearey and colleagues have put it, 
‘judges are political and that it is better to have openness about the politics of their role.’17 
Alan Paterson promoted a social interactionist approach, arguing that ‘decision-
making in the House of Lords should be seen as a social process...The printed speeches are 
but the end product of a complex series of exchanges between Bar and Bench and between 
the Law Lords themselves.’18 The interpretive politics of the judiciary set out below 
recognises the important role played by social interaction, but considers a focus on activity 
within the courtroom as to be unnecessarily limited, if our goal is to understand judicial 
activity in the round.
19
 
David Robertson furthered a legal realist argument in Judicial Discretion in the House 
of Lords.
20
 He argued that the freedom enjoyed by the judiciary in engaging in the 
interpretation of statute and preceding cases is far greater than is commonly understood,
21
 and 
that ‘taking judicial decisions to be largely unconstrained policy preferences, is a valid 
interpretation of the higher English courts’.22 On this view, concepts such as Wednesbury 
unreasonableness are merely ‘code-phrases’, telling the judge ‘how to enunciate what he has 
decided, what code language to use.’23 
The interpretive politics of the judiciary shares Robertson’s scepticism towards 
explanations of judicial outcomes which leave little room for human agency. However, it 
rejects a view of senior judicial actors as duplicitous; they may often have scope to decide a 
case either way, but they are heavily constrained by their own understanding of the behaviour 
expected of members of the senior judiciary.  
JAG Griffith’s The Politics of the Judiciary,24 first published in 1977, offered an 
analysis which absolved judges ‘of a conscious and deliberate intention to pursue their own 
interests or the interests of their class.’25 Rather, Griffith argued that because of their shared 
educational experiences, shared training and experience at the Bar and their shared social 
situation as members of the ‘Establishment’, senior British judges share an inherently 
conservative (as distinct from a Conservative) understanding of the public interest.
26
 On this 
view, the senior judiciary were therefore structurally biased against ‘progressive’ political 
agendas. 
The interpretive politics of the judiciary rejects class-based analysis on the basis that 
such a perspective denies the creative potential held by all individuals. It risks slipping into a 
deterministic narrative which leaves us with little understanding of how the activities or 
beliefs of particular individuals or groups have changed over time, or indeed may change in 
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the future. Against this background, the specific features of the interpretive politics of the 
judiciary can now be set out.  
 
1. An Interpretive Politics of the Judiciary 
 
This interpretive perspective understands change to arise: 
As situated agents respond to novel ideas or problems. [It] is a result 
of people’s ability to adopt beliefs and perform actions through a 
reasoning that is embedded in the tradition they inherit.’27 
We can unpack this statement, and thus illuminate the key components of the interpretive 
political analysis approach of Bevir and Rhodes which underpins it, by considering in turn 
the central concepts of ‘agency’, ‘beliefs’, ‘traditions’ and ‘dilemmas’. 
Reference to ‘situated agents’ points to a conception of actors who, though unable to 
‘escape from all social influences’ – they are not fully autonomous subjects – are capable of 
acting ‘creatively for reasons that make sense to them’.28 They ‘always start against a social 
background that influences them but they can reason and act in novel ways to alter this 
background.’29 
In acting, individuals draw upon beliefs and traditions. ‘Beliefs’ are 
Not just big commitments people reach through deliberate reflection. 
They include the everyday tacit understandings on which people act 
without any noticeable deliberation.
30
 
They are the meanings by which actors construct their world; they condition their 
understandings of the rules, conventions and institutional procedures which they encounter.
31
 
‘Traditions’ are ‘a set of connected beliefs and habits that intentionally or 
unintentionally passed from generation to generation at some point in the past’.32 For Bevir 
and Rhodes, ‘Traditions are not fixed entities…They are contingent, produced by the actions 
of individuals. The carriers of a tradition bring it to life.’ 33 
The common understandings which comprise traditions make ‘possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.’34 In this present context, it is important to 
note that such traditions relate not only to the judiciary’s perception of the legitimacy of the 
law’s content,35 but also on the perceived extent and limits of the boundaries of legitimate 
judicial activity.
36
 By acting, the senior judiciary address, more or less explicitly, issues such 
as the appropriate relationship between the senior judiciary and the executive, the extent to 
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which judges should adopt an ‘activist’ role and what it means for them to act in the ‘public 
interest’. 
Change occurs when actors are faced with a ‘dilemma’. Dilemmas arise ‘when a new 
belief, often itself an interpretation of an experience, stands in opposition to their existing 
ones, thereby forcing a reconsideration of the latter.’37 Dilemmas are not, in a straightforward 
sense, ‘objective pressures in the world’.38 Rather, they denote the pressures and challenges 
perceived to be true by relevant actors. They can ‘arise from both theoretical and moral 
reflection and from experiences of worldly pressures.’39 Examples include the ‘dilemma 
posed by the increasing size and scale of government,’40 or the impact of globalization upon 
economic policy.
41
  
The foregoing discussion should not be taken to argue that external constraints do not 
exist. However, an interpretive approach does understand actors often to be less constrained 
than they consider themselves to be. For example, actions taken by many nation states in the 
face of the perceived external constraints imposed by globalization can be understood to have 
entrenched the very ‘objective conditions’ on which the actions were originally predicated.42 
We should note that: 
dilemmas do not have given, nor even correct, solutions…individuals 
necessarily change traditions in what is a creative process. A tradition 
may appear to tell people how they should extend it, modify it, or 
apply it. However, it can only provide them with a guide to what they 
might do.
43
 
In an observation which resonates with Paterson’s observations on the importance of 
the ‘complex series of exchanges between Bar and Bench and between the Law Lords 
themselves’,44 ‘the only way [actors] have of checking whether their response [to a particular 
dilemma] has been true to [a particular] tradition is to ask whether they and others are happy 
with it.’45 To remain meaningful, traditions must have a degree of coherence; thus ‘people 
can integrate a new belief into their existing beliefs only by relating themes in it to themes 
already present in their beliefs. The process of change thus involves a pushing and pulling of 
the dilemma and a tradition to bring them together.’46 It will be argued below that the 
judicial activity as regards the IPP sentence exemplifies exactly this tension, as actors sought 
to make congruent their understanding of, and response to, conflicting beliefs engaged by 
dilemmas which they faced. 
 
2. Methodology 
                                                 
37
 Bevir, op. cit. n.7 , p. 58. 
38
 Bevir and Rhodes, op. cit. n. 5, p. 36. 
39
 id. 
40
 Bevir and Rhodes, op. cit. n. 27, p. 9. 
41
 C. Hay, Political Analysis (2002) ch. 6. 
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 id., ch. 6. 
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44
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The case study set out below is informed by analysis of relevant documents including legal 
judgments, judicial speeches and articles and other relevant contextual material (including 
speeches made at Chatham House rules events, legal and academic discussion of the relevant 
judgments and relevant newspaper articles). Given its underpinning assumptions, an 
interpretive approach sees great value in ethnographic or interview-based methods that enable 
the researcher to understand developments from the perspective of the research subjects. 
Therefore, and more unusually, the present article also draws on semi-structured interviews 
conducted with five relevant serving or retired senior judges. 
The term ‘senior judge’ is used to denote those judges who serve, or have served, in 
the Court of Appeal or House of Lords/Supreme Court. Often, such judges also hold 
important ‘policy’ roles within the judiciary, heading Committees, Commissions and so on.  
Ethical assurances provided to respondents preclude a more detailed discussion of their roles 
in relation to the IPP case law, though it can be noted that they were identified by the 
researcher, and recognised themselves, as being relevant to this research. The sources of 
quotes presented below are distinguished by reference to ‘Senior Judge 1’, ‘Senior Judge 2’ 
and so on. 
Seven judges were approached, with five positive responses received. One judge 
interviewed did so explicitly on behalf of himself and two judicial colleagues. While 
additional interviews would have been desirable, the making of requests ceased when it 
appeared that, due to policies in place, they would not be accepted and would likely be 
counter-productive.
47
 The interviews were conducted between December 2010 and June 
2011. Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, with four recorded and then transcribed; 
handwritten notes were made during the unrecorded interview and subsequently typed up.  
Interview requests for serving judges were delivered via the Judicial Office for 
England and Wales; requests to retired judges were delivered individually. An information 
sheet making clear the nature of the research project, and that quotes may be used in 
academic publications, was included with all interview requests and also provided to judges 
at the beginning of the interview. 
The research presented in this article forms part of a larger research project, which 
explored the creation, amendment, contestation and abolition of the IPP sentence.
48
 For this 
project 48 research interviews were conducted, in addition to the five noted above. 
Interviewees included relevant ministers, sentencing officials, Home Office and Ministry of 
Justice officials, special advisers, interest group representatives, members of the House of 
Lords and Parole Board representatives. Many of these individuals were well placed to 
provide insightful comment on the judicial activity discussed herein; quotes from these 
individuals are included where appropriate. 
 
A SENIOR JUDICIAL TRADITION 
 
Drawing on the concept of tradition set out above, a senior judicial tradition (SJT) will now 
be sketched. This SJT denotes a set of beliefs shared by members of the senior judiciary. This 
                                                 
47
 In hindsight it appears that such concerns were likely misplaced. 
48
 H. Annison, Dangerous Politics (forthcoming); H. Annison, ‘Weeding the Garden: The Third Way, the 
Westminster tradition and Imprisonment for Public Protection’ (2014) 18 Theoretical Criminology 38. 
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‘set of connected beliefs’49 are understood as being fused over time but by no means fixed, 
widely shared and influential, but not necessarily universal. 
It is not argued that there exists, nor should one seek to reify, one monolithic, 
unchanging judicial tradition. The tradition sketched here relates to the senior judiciary; it is 
likely that there exist several judicial traditions, perhaps organised loosely around legal 
specialism or the particular court in which judges sit. 
In sketching out the SJT, we can usefully begin with Lord Bingham’s depiction of the 
‘traditionalist view of the judicial role’.50 It rests ‘essentially on three propositions. The first 
relates to the separation of powers.’51 It sees ‘the task of the judges…[as] only to give effect 
to the terms of what Parliament has enacted. They have no warrant to vary, add to or subtract 
from the effect of what Parliament has enacted,’ nor to ‘give effect to what they may think 
Parliament would have intended.’52 
The second proposition relates to the non-statutory areas of the law. ‘Here the task of 
the judges is to declare what the common law is, and by implication has always been… Thus 
the judges are a neutral, colourless, undistorting medium through which the law is transmitted 
to those bound by it.’53 On this view, ‘They are not, save perhaps in a minimal sense, makers 
of the law’.54 
The third proposition is that ‘the authority and standing of the judges depend on their 
strict adherence to these rules. They enjoy the tenure, the independence and the authority 
which they do precisely because of the essentially technocratic role which they fulfil.’55 They 
have no mandate ‘to rule on what would best serve the public interest.’56 
By connecting these propositions to academic commentary we can suggest that the 
SJT involves a general desire to act ‘responsibly’,57 and thereby a trust in, and desire to shore 
up, existing administrative and government systems.
58
 The senior judiciary seek to maintain 
the standing of the senior courts and related institutions
59
 and equate stability with the public 
interest.
60
 An incrementalist approach is prioritized,
61
 with judges holding a concomitant 
belief in the ‘mirror principle’ – that the British courts should keep pace with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence but not go beyond it.
62
 Encroachment into the ‘policymaking’ arena is only 
permitted in exceptional circumstances and explicitly ‘political’ behaviour is unacceptable.63 
These features will be discussed in a little more detail, before potentially more ‘liberating’ 
aspects of the SJT are noted. 
                                                 
49
 Bevir and Rhodes, op. cit. n. 5, p. 34. 
50
 Lord Bingham, ‘The judges: active or passive?’ in Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 139, 2005 
Lectures, ed. P.J. Marshall (2007). 
51
 id., p. 2. 
52
 id., p. 3. 
53
 id. 
54
 id. 
55
 id., p. 4. 
56
 id. 
57
 Griffith, op. cit. n. 1. 
58
 Robertson, op. cit. n. 3, p. 400. 
59
 Gearey, op. cit. n. 8, p. 77; J. Rozenberg, ‘Applause in court: farewell to Lord Judge, the judge’s judge’ 
Guardian, 30 July 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jul/30/lord-chief-justice-igor-judge>. 
60
 Griffith, op. cit. n. 1; Robertson, op. cit. n. 3. 
61
 Robertson, op. cit. n. 3, p. 400. 
62
 J. Lewis, ‘The European ceiling on human rights’ (2007) Winter Public Law 726. 
63
 Ewing, op. cit. n. 10; Gearey, op. cit. n. 8, p. 91. 
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Scholars have identified a persistent belief among the senior judiciary that 
‘policymaking’ is not a legitimate part of judicial activity. The judiciary should, and do, stand 
above and apart from the political class.
64
 In developing the common law, judges must 
proceed ‘from a baseline of existing principle.’65 While this process may engage policy 
considerations, it is widely understood that ‘in those cases where the formation of principle 
involves too great an intrusion into the field of policy, the judge must defer to Parliament.’66 
Several reasons are generally given for this deference. Some justify it on the basis of 
the democratic legitimacy of Parliament, a notion at the heart of the separation of powers 
doctrine.
67
 As one judge interviewed put it, ‘There are discussions. But the judiciary will not 
advise the government on policy. Because that just ain’t our job’ (Senior judge 3). Others 
have suggested that it flows from ‘the differentiation of the tasks of the courts and 
Parliament’, with ‘independence [making] the courts more suited to deciding some kinds of 
questions and being elected [making] the legislature or executive more suited to deciding 
others.’68  
Scholars such as Jonathan Lewis have argued that the historically incrementalist 
approach of the House of Lords has continued,
69
 notwithstanding the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
70
 For Lewis, a ‘mirror principle’ has developed whereby ‘the duty 
of the national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less.’71 This has been argued by Keith Ewing to lead to the 
contradictory position: 
adopted by judges who claim or assert power...[while being] 
simultaneously reluctant to use the powers they already have. A great 
deal of restraint is to be seen in the approach of the courts to the 
Human Rights Act.
72
 
However, within these self-imposed boundaries lies a fierce protectiveness of an 
element which suggests a more ‘liberating’ understanding of the SJT: ‘judicial discretion, 
with its concomitant principle of judicial independence, is central to the self-concept of the 
[Anglo-Australian] judiciary.’73 As David Riesman put it, ‘many judges resent the straitjacket 
that codes and legislation seek to impose on their wish to maintain an easy or “muddling 
through” fluidity.’74 More recently, Nigel Fielding has similarly identified ‘an occupational 
culture bearing values supporting resistance to outside influence.’75 
Fielding found that the British and American judges he interviewed held conventional 
attitudes regarding a reluctance to engage in policymaking, but ‘nevertheless testified to 
activist perspectives that they squarely attributed to feeling obliged to resist a succession of 
“bad” governments that had legislated “bad law”.’76 Fielding described this as ‘conservative 
activism’, an effort to resist the outside influences of governments and a public ‘convinced 
                                                 
64
 N. Lacey, The Prisoners' Dilemma (2008) 96. 
65
 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, per Lord Scarman at para.430. See also Robertson, op. cit. n. 3. 
66
 Gearey, op. cit. n. 8, p. 88. 
67
 S. Fredman, ‘From Deference to Democracy’ (2005) 122 Law Q. Rev. 53; A. Kavanagh, ‘Judging the Judges 
under the Human Rights Act’ (2009) Public Law 287. 
68
 R. (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23, para. 76. 
69
 Robertson, op. cit. n. 3. 
70
 Lewis, op. cit. n. 62. See also H. Fenwick et al., Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (2011). 
71
 R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 A.C. 323, para. 20. 
72
 Ewing, op. cit. n. 10, p. 268. 
73
 A. Freiberg, ‘Guerrilas in Our Midst?’ in Dangerous Offenders, ed. D. Brown and J. Pratt (2000) 62. 
74
 D. Riesman, ‘Law and Sociology’ in Abundance for What, and Other Essays, ed. D Riesman (1957) 458-459. 
75
 Fielding, op. cit. n. 9, p. 114. 
76
 Fielding, op. cit. n. 9, p. 99. 
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the judiciary generally gets sentences wrong.’77 Examples abound of judicial efforts to ‘find 
ways around’ or to correct ill-considered laws made by government.78 Pertinent examples 
include the judiciary’s obliteration of the Criminal Justice Act 1991’s efforts to remove 
previous convictions as a sentencing consideration,
79
 and the substantial emasculation of the 
mandatory sentences contained in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
80
 
Such ‘activism’ was memorably described by Lord Woolf as a valuable central 
feature of the British common law system: 
[It] enables the courts to vary the extent of their intervention to 
reflect current needs, and by this means it helps to maintain the 
delicate balance of a democratic society.
81
 
Some would go further and suggest that any accurate conception of a SJT must 
include not only a belief in the value of judicial discretion, but also support for ‘fundamental 
principles and approaches of the common law...in particular proportionality, discretion and 
natural justice.’82 For example, Arie Freiberg has argued that, ‘Consciously or unconsciously, 
Anglo-Australian judges have been steeped in the principles of classical jurisprudence.’83  
However, various scholars have argued convincingly that the incoherent and eclectic 
use of competing philosophies of punishment by the British judiciary demonstrates that any 
apparent prioritization of a particular sentencing goal is more accurately understood as an 
artefact of post hoc rationalization.
84
 We might therefore suggest that the SJT does not 
include settled endorsement of a particular sentencing principle, but rather involves a belief in 
the legitimacy of an ad hoc, case-by-case prioritization supportive of a fluidity which 
supports the realization of justice in individual cases. 
This sketch is not intended as an encyclopaedic definition of a fixed entity, but rather 
a pragmatic description of a set of connected beliefs which most members of the senior 
judiciary might recognise as underpinning their activity.
85
 With this judicial tradition 
sketched, the key legal judgments relating to the IPP sentence will now be explored. 
 
CASE STUDY: THE IMPRISONMENT FOR PUBLIC PROTECTION CASE LAW AND 
JUDICIAL POLITICS 
 
The Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence constituted the headline provision of a 
new sentencing regime for ‘dangerous offenders’ introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 
(CJA) 2003. The legislation provided a framework whereby those deemed to pose a 
‘significant risk to members of the public of serious harm’86 would be liable either to 
                                                 
77
 Fielding, op. cit. n. 9, p. 114. This is not to say that judges self-identify as ‘activist’. 
78
 Fielding, op. cit. n. 9, p. 110. 
79
 M. Cavadino and J. Dignan, The Penal System: An introduction (2007) 114-115, 374-375. 
80
 T. Jones and T. Newburn, ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out: Exploring Symbol and Substance in American and 
British Crime Control Politics’ (2006) 46 Brit. J. of Criminology 5. 
81
 L. Woolf, ‘Droit Public - English Style’ (1995) Public Law 57. 
82
 Freiberg, op. cit. n. 73, p. 66. 
83
 Freiberg, op. cit. n. 73, p. 58. 
84
 See L. Zedner, Criminal Justice (2004) 181; A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2010), ch. 3; 
Robertson, op. cit. n. 3, p. 385. 
85
 Bevir and Rhodes, op. cit. n. 5, p. 33-4. 
86
 Section 229(1) CJA 2003. 
11 
 
imprisonment for life, imprisonment for public protection, or an extended sentence.
87
 
Initially, if the defendant met the statutory conditions, imposition of an IPP sentence was 
mandatory. Vastly expanding the scope of indeterminate sentences, over 6,500 IPP sentences 
had been imposed by 31 March 2012.
88
 This has contributed to a fundamental change in the 
nature of the prison population, with one in five prisoners now serving indeterminate 
sentences.
89
 Subsequently amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, its 
effects reverberate still, long after its abolition by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act 2012.
90
 
 
1. Judicial Concerns 
 
The judiciary’s concerns began with the policy process. The relevant White Paper, ‘Justice 
for All’,91 gave only a limited indication of the likely nature and potential impact of what 
would become the IPP sentence. As the Parliamentary stages of the Criminal Justice Bill 
neared in November 2002, more detailed proposals were provided to relevant bodies such as 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council and the Council of Circuit Judges, but only at a very late 
stage.
92
 It was clear that this was in no way a consultative exercise: ‘These were not 
provisions that were going to be resiled from’ (Home Office official).  
Then Home Secretary David Blunkett’s distrust of the senior judiciary was made clear 
in February 2003, when the trial judge’s freedom to decide whether the imposition of an IPP 
was appropriate was further restricted by a revision to the relevant clauses of the Bill. This 
was justified, in Prisons minister Hilary Benn’s characteristically under-stated manner, on the 
basis that an absence of heavy restrictions on judicial discretion ‘could undermine the 
purpose of the new provisions.’93 The government’s actions suggested that the judiciary were 
perceived as troublesome ‘guerrillas in their midst.’94 
On 26 April 2005, three weeks after the implementation of the dangerous offender 
provisions, members of the senior judiciary took the unusual step of making public their 
concerns at specific legislative provisions: 
The judges, speaking to The Guardian on condition of anonymity, 
fear the Criminal Justice Act 2003 could lead to an explosion in the 
prison population and that mandatory measures could force them to 
impose sentences which are unfair in all the circumstances of the 
case.
95
 
In exploring the reasons for such deep concern, one senior judge interviewed recalled 
that central to many judges’ thinking was: 
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the old concept of retribution...there’s got to be a degree of fairness, 
of proportionality in Human Rights Act terms between the sentence 
which is passed and what has been done (Senior judge 1). 
Another senior judge noted that: 
I think that was a sort of cultural thing in a sort of way, I don’t think 
we have ever felt very comfortable with the idea that you’re 
punishing somebody for what they might do, as opposed to what they 
have done.  We were all brought up, so to speak, in the “just deserts” 
sort of school of punishment. You only reserve a sentence which is 
there for protection of the public for those who’ve done something 
really serious. Which, in other words, justifies the life sentences. And 
I think we all felt more comfortable with that sort of regime than we 
did in the first instance being made to impose an IPP (Senior judge 
2).
96
 
The recollections of one judge reflect in part an inclination towards a ‘classical’ 
sentencing philosophy,
97
 but more broadly his concerns regarding the potential for unfairness: 
Taken at its face, the assumptions of “dangerousness” contained 
within the Act as originally passed made it difficult for a judge – 
seeking honestly to construe the legislation – to avoid making the 
presumption [that the defendant was dangerous] in cases where an 
indeterminate sentence would never have been considered. And this 
caused us a real problem, because there is a dichotomy between the 
principles of punishment – on the one hand a retributive view which 
could be interpreted as Nigel Walker, Professor of the Institute of 
Criminology, would have interpreted it as “distributive 
retributivism”.98 No more than an eye for an eye, and no more than a 
tooth for a tooth, [and this was] giving way to a utilitarian view of 
punishment, that the greater good of society was served by ensuring 
that those whom society deemed dangerous were locked up until they 
weren’t dangerous. Almost irrespective of what they’d done (Senior 
judge 3). 
Given the potential imposition of severely disproportionate sentences, the senior 
judiciary were clear that the restriction of judicial discretion was of as much, if not more, 
concern than the nature of the sentence itself.
99
 Judicial discretion was seen as the essential 
means by which the potential injustices brought about by the IPP sentence might be obviated: 
It’s a question of where you draw the line. I have no difficulty with 
the principle [of prevention]. If there is developing knowledge – I’m 
always...[sceptical] about psychiatrists and psychologists, but – I’m 
perfectly happy to accept that if there is sensible research that shows, 
for want of a better phrase, that it’s possible to predict with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy that [an individual], at any rate for the 
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next ten years, is likely to be causing problems, well, then fine. The 
judges ought to be able to have access to that material and use those 
tools. But at the end of the day, what I do resist is judges being put in 
straitjackets, which produces injustice in particular cases (Senior 
judge 1, emphasis added). 
The ‘attempt to tie the judiciary down’ in relation to sentencing was reflected on by another 
senior judge as ‘an ongoing, and great problem’ (Senior judge 5).100 
Finally, there was also anxiety about what these sentencing changes would mean for 
the prison population,
101
 with lectures from David Thomas at Judicial Studies Board seminars 
making it ‘obvious to all that the provisions, if applied literally, would result in thousands of 
offenders being given indeterminate sentences in circumstances where their offence or 
conviction would make that hard to justify on any common sense basis.’102 This was the ‘real 
overriding concern…just entirely unsustainable’ (Senior judge 5). 
From its inception, the systems of rehabilitation and parole required by the IPP 
sentence were significantly under-resourced,
103
 which along with the risk-averse political 
rhetoric surrounding the sentence contributed to a substantial increase in IPP prisoners. The 
number of IPP prisoners rose swiftly from 1,079 in June 2006 to 4,461 in June 2008 and 
5,828 in January 2010.
104
 IPP prisoners found themselves at the end of their tariff period, but 
unable to demonstrate that they no longer represented a risk to members of the public. They 
often found themselves unable even to obtain a timely Parole Board hearing in which to 
argue their case.
105
 In short, the senior judiciary’s worst fears were being borne out. 
This ‘lamentable state of affairs’106 was heavily criticised both in legal judgments and 
public speeches.
107
 The consequence of the under-funding was described by the notably 
outspoken Lord Justice Laws thus: ‘the prison population is swollen by persons whose 
incarceration retributive justice does not require and whose release executive management 
does not allow.’108 If the Home Secretary considered the senior judiciary to be irresponsible, 
there were ample reasons for the feeling to be mutual.
109
 
 
2. The Judiciary Respond 
 
The introduction of the IPP sentence, and the resulting systemic problems, led to several 
high-profile cases. The resulting judgments centred on two issues: first, the meaning and 
scope of the IPP provisions and second, the lawfulness of the post-tariff detention of IPP 
prisoners in a context where the IPP system was suffering from severe under-resourcing.  
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(a) Interpreting the Legislative Provisions 
 
The case of Lang
110
 constituted the Court of Appeal’s first opportunity to provide guidance to 
courts on the ‘dangerous offender’ provisions of the CJA 2003. The judgment, heard on 3 
November 2005, brought together 13 separate cases, where, in all but one, sentences of life 
imprisonment; imprisonment or detention for public protection;
111
 or extended sentences, had 
been imposed.
112
 
The judgment of the court was delivered by Lord Justice Rose. It was cast as ‘merely 
an attempt to summarise the approach to sentencing which the Act requires and to give 
guidance as to its meaning.’113 However, commentators and judges alike were in no doubt 
that the judgment constituted an effort to ‘talk down’ the use of the sentence, advancing a 
limited interpretation of the provisions which arguably constituted an attempt to rebut the 
fundamental premise of the IPP sentence and to reshape it accordingly.
114
 
Lord Justice Rose was renowned both for his criticism of the CJA 2003 and his 
propensity, as one judge put it, ‘to stretch the principles of statutory interpretation to the 
limit’ (Senior judge 4). His approach was no different in the present case. For example, Rose 
LJ emphasized that in relation to the identification of a ‘significant risk of serious harm’, 
‘significant’ should be taken to mean ‘of considerable amount...or importance.’115  Further, 
where the anticipated future offence is not serious, ‘there will be comparatively few cases in 
which a risk of serious harm will properly be regarded as significant.’116 
Notwithstanding the restrictive wording of the IPP sentence, Lord Justice Rose 
stressed the importance of judicial discretion. Casting its exercise as ‘historically, at the very 
heart of judicial sentencing,’117 Lord Justice Rose stated that ‘the language of the statute 
indicates that judges are expected, albeit starting from the assumption [that offenders falling 
within the provisions’ scope are “dangerous”], to exercise their ability to reach a reasonable 
conclusion in the light of the information before them.’118 Therefore: 
In our judgment, when sections 229 and 224 of the [2003 Criminal 
Justice] Act are read together, unless the information about offences, 
pattern of behaviour and the offender (to which regard must be paid 
under section 229(3) of the Act) show a significant risk of serious 
harm (defined by section 224 of the Act as death or serious injury) 
from further offences, it will usually be unreasonable to conclude 
that the assumption applies.
119
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Faced with the threat of the penal system being inundated with indeterminate IPP prisoners as 
a consequence of these ‘labyrinthine’ provisions,120 Rose LJ did not hesitate to react. 
Renowned sentencing academic David Thomas described it as an ‘important 
judgment’ and a ‘welcome indication that sentencers should take a restrained and careful 
approach to making the finding of a significant risk of serious harm.’121 One judge recalled 
that, while Lord Justice Rose was somewhat ‘pushing the envelope in Lang’ (Senior judge 3), 
it was a positive development because 
what Lang did was provide judges with an additional element of 
discretion, to seek to filter out those cases which truly did not justify 
the very, very serious sanction that IPP constitutes. Because what a 
number of us – I’m sure all judges – readily appreciated, was that 
Imprisonment for Public Protection was as near to a life sentence as 
it is possible to get (Senior judge 3). 
As another judge approvingly recalled, 
to some extent, the Vice President Lord Justice Rose was...pushing 
out the boundaries within which the exercise of discretion was 
appropriate by saying that ‘exceptional’ actually meant…‘if it didn’t 
dot every “i” and cross every “t” then it could be exceptional’. 
Whereas you and I could discuss what that word means as a matter of 
English and reach a different conclusion. So, had it not been for Lang 
I have absolutely no doubt that many more sentences of 
Imprisonment for Public Protection would have been passed (Senior 
judge 4). 
Subsequent to Lang, the Court of Appeal, in judgments such as Johnson
122
 and Isa,
123
 
re-iterated the restrictive interpretation of the IPP sentence. These cases served ‘to amplify 
and clarify the guidance given in Lang, rather than to qualify it,’124 as one judge explained: 
 [We] took it further in a series of cases where we refined Lang in a 
sense, and made it plain, you know, that there is a purpose behind 
this legislation and if this particular case or the person in front of you 
doesn’t really fall into the category of those for whom Parliament 
must have intended this you don’t, you don’t say he’s dangerous, or 
you try and avoid saying he’s dangerous (Senior judge 2). 
Despite these efforts, concerns persisted that trial judges were continuing to over-
utilize the ‘Dangerous Offender’ provisions. In a speech given to the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Penal Affairs on 28 March 2006, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, chose the 
IPP sentence as his central topic. He noted that ‘sentencers were imposing sentences of IPP 
for comparatively trivial offences – I heard of one where the sentence was as short as two 
months.’125 He also reiterated judicial concerns with the potential ‘pressures that the new 
regime is going to place on both the parole board and the probation service’126 and the 
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potential for ‘capacity problems in the prisons and [resultant] serious disciplinary problems 
for those who run the prisons.’127 
With the IPP sentence continuing to cause disquiet, in September 2007 the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council took the exceptional step of publishing a ‘guide’, rather than the usual 
‘guidelines’, entitled ‘Dangerous Offenders: A Guide for Sentencers and Practitioners’.128  
The possibility of issuing guidelines in relation to the ‘Dangerous Offender’ 
provisions of the CJA 2003 had been discussed by members of the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council and Home Office officials in December 2004, before the provisions came into 
force.
129
 However, a different path was chosen: 
[Lord Justice] Rose was deputy chairman of the [Sentencing 
Guidelines] Council, obviously the leading judge on sentencing 
issues. The great advantage of the Court of Appeal compared with 
the Council is that it can act much more quickly where something is 
needed. So in the end, the judgment was that it was going to be much 
easier and better for the Court of Appeal to pull together some cases 
and issue some guidance, guidelines, whatever you call them. Which 
they did initially in Lang and then in the cases that followed. 
(Sentencing official) 
A well-placed civil servant recalled the political nature of the document’s creation: 
When we were drafting the document we worked closely with the 
policy officials who were involved in handling the policy aspects of 
the problems of the legislation. And they would have taken 
soundings from ministers. But we were just bringing together what 
already existed, rather than creating something new. So there 
wouldn’t have been any benefit in doing any sort of formal 
consultation (Sentencing official). 
Taken as a whole, these activities suggest that relevant members of the senior 
judiciary are careful and considered policymakers. The Lord Chief Justice used public 
speeches to maintain pressure on the government to recognise and address the problems 
posed by the IPP sentence, while Lang and subsequent judgments sought to promote a 
restrained reading of the IPP sentence in law. 
Applying the interpretive terminology set out above, we can suggest that the 
dilemmas presented by the IPP sentence posed an important question to relevant members of 
the senior judiciary: was it legitimate, within the SJT as generally understood, to seek to 
restrain the application of the IPP sentence and its effects in the ways set out above? The 
following quote apparently provides a straightforward response: 
Parliament are entitled to require us to alter our approach. That’s 
what legislation does in every single field. It provides a steer to the 
exercise of discretion (Senior judge 3). 
However, this apparently clear ‘rule’ is open to a more expansive interpretation: 
If the legislation allows one result which is draconian, will fill the 
prisons with no very good reason and another interpretation, perfectly 
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legitimately, produces a less draconian result but nonetheless 
provides protection for the public in the most serious cases, then the  
judges are entitled to follow that course. And, over a period of time, 
if Parliament don’t like what’s happened then they can do something 
about it (Senior judge 1).
130
 
The judicial activity surveyed above suggests that the efforts to restrain the IPP sentence were 
very much understood to be legitimate, according with the SJT as commonly understood. 
 
(b) Post-Tariff Detention of IPP Prisoners 
 
The key judicial review judgments relating to the legality of the post-tariff detention of IPP 
prisoners are Wells (High Court),
131
 Walker and Wells (Court of Appeal),
132
 and James, Lee 
and Wells (House of Lords).
133
 Wells was heard on 22 June 2007. The case was brought by 
two IPP prisoners, one held beyond tariff and one approaching that point in time. 
Three legal arguments were put before Lord Justice Laws and Justice Mitting in the 
High Court.
134
 The first was based on the common law concept of ‘irrationality’, or 
‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’:135 the Secretary of State’s failure to properly resource the 
system for IPP prisoners constituted ‘a course of action so unreasonable that the court should 
condemn it as unlawful.’136 This lack of adequate resourcing (and resultant difficulties in 
obtaining timely Parole Board hearings) was also argued to result in the breach of the 
claimants’ Article 5(1) and 5(4) European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) rights. A 
finding of a breach of Article 5 would have signalled the unlawfulness of the claimant 
prisoners’ detention and entitled the claimants to compensation.137 Further, such a judgment 
would have inflicted severe political damage on the Secretary of State for Justice and the 
government of the day. 
Lord Justice Laws recognised a clear difficulty for the claimants, namely that ‘it is 
well settled that the courts are generally in no position to make judgments upon competing 
claims for the allocation of scarce public resources, and will decline to do so.’138 However, he 
argued that the ‘correct outcome of these proceedings...lies in deeper considerations.’139 For 
while, 
both elements – the whole sentence – are formally justified by the 
order of the sentencing court...the justification that is required for 
[the prisoner’s] detention after the tariff’s expiry…is of an altogether 
different character. This further detention is not at all justified by or 
at the time of sentence, for the very reason that the extent to which, 
or the time for which, the prisoner will remain a danger is unknown 
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at the time of sentence. It can only be ascertained on a continuing 
basis, by periodic assessment.
140
 
It was ‘a straightforward point of law’ that: 
Without current and periodic means of assessing the prisoner’s risk 
the regime cannot work as Parliament intended, and the only possible 
justification for the prisoner’s further detention is altogether absent. 
In that case the detention is arbitrary and unreasonable on first 
principles, and therefore unlawful.
141
 
Lord Justice Laws has garnered a reputation for ‘judicial evangelism’.142 He has 
argued, for example, that embedded in Britain’s constitution is ‘the imperative of democracy 
itself and those [fundamental] rights...which cannot be denied save by a plea of guilty to 
totalitarianism’.143 This belief in fundamental rights is reflected in the Wells judgment, seen 
for example in the assertion that: 
Whether or not the prisoner ceases to present a danger cannot be a 
neutral consideration, in statute or policy. If it were, we would forego 
any claim to a rational and humane (and efficient) prison regime.
144
 
For Laws LJ, the ‘imperative that treats imprisonment strictly and always as a last 
resort’145 must be recognised. This was the foundational principle which supported the 
understanding: 
that government would provide offending behaviour courses and the 
like so as to enable lifers to be released at or as soon as possible after 
tariff expiry where the risk they posed at that stage could be shown to 
be low enough for that to be justified.
146
 
The Wells judgment constituted a strident attack on the failures of the IPP sentence, 
and on a government that had shown itself incapable of adequately implementing its own 
policies and, thereby, upholding prisoners’ basic rights.147 Laws LJ appears mindful of the 
SJT, careful to couch his judgment not as a discussion of ‘the wisdom or practicality of this 
or that use of scarce resources’, but as ‘a straightforward point of law.’148 However, the 
judgment clearly demonstrates Laws LJ’s beliefs and his desire to apply pressure to a 
government of whom the judiciary appeared to despair. 
In a subsequent claim for judicial review by an IPP prisoner held beyond tariff heard 
on 20 August 2007,
149
 Justice Collins followed Lord Justice Laws’ reasoning, directing the 
claimant prisoner’s immediate release. However, the prisoner’s release was stayed, pending a 
combined appeal to the Court of Appeal. In a passage which could not avoid causing alarm to 
the Ministry of Justice, Justice Collins noted that, if Laws LJ’s analysis was correct, 
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the consequences are truly, in one sense, disastrous, because I think it 
is inevitable logic following from what Laws LJ has indicated that a 
prisoner such as the claimant...will have to be released whether or not 
he remains a risk to the public.
150
 
The policy concerns that underpinned the Wells judgment were reiterated by then 
President of the Queen’s Bench Division Sir Igor Judge on 3 July 2007, several weeks before 
Laws LJ delivered his judgment. Speaking to the Justice Committee, he observed that: 
By the year 2012 the Home Office statistics estimate we will have 
25,000 of these [IPP] prisoners. We think—and we are only 
guessing—that for the judges to be available to consider the parole 
reports…the Parole Board will need some 100 extra judges. Where 
will they come from? Where will these 25,000 be kept in custody? 
What effect will this have on the prison population? It is for 
Parliament to say. I am merely pointing out that the IPP has already 
had and will continue to have an extraordinary effect on prison 
populations.
151
 
In response to the above judgments and growing criticism of the IPP sentence,
152
 the 
government revealed that amendments to the IPP were being formulated. These were said to 
involve the introduction of a minimum tariff, an increase in judicial discretion, and the 
provision of additional resources for prisoner training courses.
153
 
The combined appeal from Wells and James was heard by the Court of Appeal in 
November 2007, with then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, delivering 
judgment on 1 February 2008. Surveying ‘an unhappy state of affairs’,154 the court upheld 
Lord Justice Laws’ finding that the Secretary of State’s failure to resource adequately the 
Prison Service and Parole Board so as to enable the Dangerous Offender provision of the 
CJA 2003 to operate as intended was unlawful. Lord Phillips stated that: 
We are satisfied that [the Secretary of State’s] conduct has been in 
breach of his public law duty because its direct and natural 
consequence is to make it likely that a proportion of IPP prisoners 
will, avoidably, be kept in prison for longer than necessary either for 
punishment or for protection of the public, contrary to the intention 
of Parliament (and the objective of article 5 [ECHR] to which 
Parliament must have been mindful).
155
 
The judgment was predicated on the view that the government’s failure as regards 
resourcing meant that IPP prisoners were not being provided with a ‘fair chance of ceasing to 
be, and showing that they had ceased to be, dangerous.’156 Lord Phillips concurred with Lord 
Justice Laws’ statement that the rehabilitation of IPP prisoners was a ‘premise of the 
legislation.’157 On this basis, Lord Phillips deplored the 
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systemic failure on the part of the Secretary of State to put in place 
the resources necessary to implement the scheme of rehabilitation 
necessary to enable the relevant provisions to function as intended.
158,
 
However, Lord Phillips concluded that, given the legislation in place (in particular s28 
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 concerning prisoner release),
159
 it was not possible to subscribe 
to Lord Justice Laws’ view of post-tariff IPP prisoners as being ‘unlawfully detained’ and 
accordingly ruled that the order for release in James should be set aside.
160
 The appropriate 
remedy in these circumstances was limited to declaratory relief.
161
  
As Patricia Londono noted at the time, this judgment ‘could legitimately be 
characterised as cautious.’162 Lord Phillips’ deep concern at the IPP sentence and its effects is 
evident, but the judgment was mitigated by the requirement to ‘give effect to [the law] 
Parliament has enacted’163 and the judiciary’s reluctance to engage in an expansive 
interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights
164
 – central features of the SJT. 
Nonetheless, pressure was maintained by Lord Phillips, who suggested that if the present 
situation continued, with many Parole Board hearings effectively constituting ‘an empty 
exercise’, a breach of Article 5(4) ECHR would likely be found.165 Further, it was suggested 
that while this stage had not yet been reached, the more damaging finding of a government 
breach of Article 5(1) ECHR may occur, 
when the stage is reached that it is no longer necessary for the 
protection of the public that they should be confined or if so long 
elapses without a meaningful review of this question that their 
detention becomes disproportionate or arbitrary.
166
 
Lord Phillips went even further, stating that if such problems continued: 
There are circumstances in which the Secretary of State can release 
prisoners before they have served a minimum custodial term...It 
might be argued that one or other of these powers can and should 
properly be stretched so as to enable and require the Secretary of 
State to release a prisoner if his continued detention will infringe 
article 5(1).
167
  
While that question was left ‘for another day’,168 it was a clear signal to the 
government that a continued failure to address the problems of the IPP sentence would not be 
tolerated by the senior judiciary.
169
 Lord Phillips’ determination to apply pressure to the 
executive in such instances of government failure has been a feature of his Supreme Court,
170
 
and was in evidence here. However, equally evident is the enduring influence of the 
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‘traditionalist view of the judicial role’171 and the limitations that it entails. Application for 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords was made by two of the claimant prisoners, with leave 
granted by the House of Lords on 15 January 2009. 
By the time of the House of Lords’ judgment on 6 May 2009, the amendments of the 
IPP sentence contained within the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 had been 
brought into law. The legislation introduced a minimum two-year (four-year determinate 
equivalent) tariff and increased judicial discretion, while efforts were underway by the 
Ministry of Justice to expedite IPP prisoners’ progress through the penal system.172 Then 
Secretary of State for Justice Jack Straw worked hard to rebuild relationships with the 
judiciary and to address problems such as those caused by the IPP sentence.
173
 
Nonetheless, the Lord Chief Justice made public his concern that there remained, 
a substantial number of IPP prisoners sentenced under the old 
regime, who have served their tariffs but who are faced with 
difficulty in satisfying the Parole Board that they no longer constitute 
a risk to the public.
174
 
It was in this context that the House of Lords considered the same issues as first set 
out in Wells, with the Parole Board given leave to intervene in the case as an interested party. 
Their Lordships agreed with the Court of Appeal that ‘the Secretary of State failed deplorably 
in the public law duty that he must be taken to have accepted when he persuaded Parliament 
to introduce indeterminate sentences for public protection (‘IPPs’)’.175 By the time of the 
judgment this had been expressly accepted by the Secretary of State.
176
 
However, the Law Lords concluded that the legislation and case law in place made it 
impossible to regard post-tariff IPP prisoners as ‘unlawfully detained’ and, further, compelled 
a restrictive interpretation of the obligations of the Secretary of State, the Prison Service and 
the Parole Board as regards IPP prisoners.
177
 Not least amongst these was the recognition that 
s142(2)(c) Criminal Justice Act 2003 expressly disapplied s142(1) to the ‘Dangerous 
Offender’ provisions of the 2003 Act – a fact which the High Court and Court of Appeal 
were noted to have overlooked.
178
 In other words, the government could not have been 
clearer in its emphasis that ‘the first and obvious purpose of these provisions is the protection 
of the public from the risks posed by dangerous offenders’;179 the reform and rehabilitation of 
offenders was a secondary consideration, at best. 
Accepting that the failure to resource the IPP system adequately had caused 
substantial delays and other problems for many prisoners, Lord Hope nonetheless stated that, 
the failures for which the Secretary of State accepts responsibility, 
while highly regrettable, cannot be said to have created a breakdown 
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of [an] extreme kind...The causal link with the [public protection] 
objectives of the sentencing court has not been broken.
180
 
On the same point, Lord Brown built upon Lord Hope’s formalistic reading of the relevant 
law by suggesting that: 
To my mind, however, before the causal link could be adjudged 
broken, the Parole Board would have to have been unable to form 
any view of dangerousness for a period of years rather than months. 
It should not, after all, be forgotten that the Act itself provides for 
two-year intervals between references to the Parole Board.
181
 
The court ruled that Article 5(1) ECHR was not breached by the Secretary of State’s 
failure to make adequate provision of training courses, to enable progression through the 
system and properly resource the Parole Board. However, it was stated that a ‘prolonged 
failure’ to enable a prisoner to demonstrate that he was safe for release may breach Article 
5(1): 
Like Lord Brown, I should not exclude the possibility of an article 
5(1) challenge in the case of a prisoner sentenced to IPP and allowed 
to languish in prison for years without receiving any of the attention 
which both the policy and the relevant rules, and ultimately common 
humanity, require.
182
 
As regards Article 5(4), it was held that this was concerned with procedure rather than 
substance. The Parole Board was required by statute to release a prisoner serving an IPP only 
when satisfied that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that he should 
be so confined,
183
 and it was open to them to decide what, and how much, information is 
needed to decide on a prisoner’s suitability for release. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
argument that for many IPP prisoners Parole Board hearings constituted an empty exercise, 
Article 5(4) was not breached. The ECHR jurisprudence did not go so far as to support the 
claimants’ argument and it was for Strasbourg, not the Law Lords, to pursue a more 
expansive interpretation, if they so wished.
184
 Therefore their Lordships concluded that the 
Secretary of State had acted unlawfully, but only on the common law ground of 
‘irrationality’.  
The judgments proceeded on the basis that the problems surrounding the IPP sentence 
were predominantly historical: 
deficiencies are, at last, being made good. Speaking very generally, 
courses and training are available and offenders may take advantage 
of them. The information being made available to the Parole Board 
when considering whether the offenders should remain in custody is 
more extensive and evidence-based, and it can make better informed 
decisions.
185
 
Research conducted by Jacobson and Hough and joint thematic reports by HM Chief 
Inspectors Prisons and Probation suggests that the Law Lords’ judgments constituted an over-
optimistic, even complacent, reading of the situation facing IPP prisoners in early 2009.
186
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The case subsequently reached Strasbourg. The European Court of Human Rights, in 
contrast to the House of Lords, concluded that rehabilitation was a central premise of the IPP 
sentence.
187
 It therefore ruled that the Secretary of State for Justice’s failure to adequately 
resource the systems on which the IPP sentence depended did breach Article 5(1) ECHR.
188
 
Considered through an interpretive lens, the House of Lords can be understood to 
have responded to the dilemma posed by the effects of the IPP sentence with a judgment 
couched firmly within Lord Bingham’s ‘traditionalist’ understanding of the judicial role.189 
Their responsibility was ‘to give effect to the terms of what Parliament has enacted’190 and no 
more. As one judge put it, ‘We apply the laws that Parliament has chosen to enact. And we 
do so because we have taken an oath to uphold the law’ (Senior judge 4). 
Further insight is provided by consideration of Lord Judge’s response to the 
amendment of the IPP sentence: 
[The] statutory assumption of dangerousness in section 229(3) has 
disappeared. No court will mourn its departure. Its judgment of 
dangerousness can now be made untrammelled by artificial 
constraints. That said...[IPP] remains an important sentencing 
alternative available to the court.
191
 
This quote reminds us that members of the judiciary, not least the most senior criminal judge 
in England and Wales, were not necessarily opposed to the availability of an indeterminate 
sentence targeted at the ‘dangerous’. Indeed, more than one judge described the sentence as 
‘for some categories of offenders, extremely useful’ (Senior judge 2). 
In addition, we can note that in a case heard at the same time as Walker and James,
192
 
the Court of Appeal considered whether the Parole Board constituted an ‘independent 
tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 5(1) ECHR.193 The judgment emphasized the centrality 
of an independent Parole Board to a just and effective penal system. A ruling by the Court of 
Appeal or the House of Lords that the IPP sentence was fundamentally unlawful – and 
potentially that IPP prisoners should be released without assessment by the Parole Board – 
would have conveyed deeply contradictory messages. Considered in the light of the SJT, it 
would have constituted fundamentally irresponsible activity. 
JUDICIAL POLITICS, THE PRE-EMPTIVE TURN AND THE LIMITS OF THE 
JUDICIAL TRADITION 
The above discussion has explored the nature of judicial activity, specifically by reference to 
a ‘senior judicial tradition’. By tracing the senior judiciary’s response to the IPP sentence, we 
have seen that the senior judiciary are thoughtful participants in a political process, as well as 
(and simultaneously) conscientious, sincere interpreters of the law. 
Judges, as with all political actors, are not captives of their traditions, but strategic 
actors able to draw on, and potentially re-shape, them as they confront particular dilemmas. 
The activities of Lord Justice Rose, Laws LJ and Lord Phillips suggest that they were deeply 
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concerned by the effects of the IPP sentence but also by its very existence. Lord Judge and 
some of those interviewed, on the other hand, considered the IPP to remain ‘an important 
sentencing alternative.’194 The former group appear to have been motivated by those aspects 
of the SJT which emphasize the value and necessity of proportionality, judicial discretion and 
the taking of a robust approach to ‘bad law’. 
However, these aspects were at all stages balanced by a recognition of the centrality 
of legal formalism and Parliamentary deference, which increasingly came to dominate the 
substantive legal judgments. Where there is full-frontal assault on the IPP sentence in 
Wells,
195
 there is a Sword of Damocles in James, Lee and Wells.
196
 The dominant 
understanding of the SJT resulted in more cautious substantive challenges to the principle and 
practice of the IPP sentence, although the strength of feeling is revealed by the obiter 
statements and extra-judicial speeches. 
Lord Woolf’s important statement, which casts the senior judiciary as a body that 
seeks to ‘vary the extent of their intervention to reflect current needs...to maintain the delicate 
balance of a democratic society,’197 was noted above. This understanding can be seen as 
central to the senior judiciary’s response to the IPP sentence. Alarmed by the reckless 
policymaking of Home Secretary David Blunkett, the senior judiciary attempted to use 
relevant judgments, public lectures, Select Committee appearances and anonymous 
newspaper briefings to ensure that the IPP sentence was put ‘back on track’. As the perceived 
threat declined, the calculations informing their ‘delicate balancing’ altered, justifying a more 
limited approach. 
The case study provides evidence suggestive of some level of co-ordination of senior 
judicial interventions. Interviewees did not deny co-ordinating their activity with colleagues, 
but nor did they present their historical recollections in such terms. Reflection on the above 
case study, coupled with recognition of the centrality of independence to judicial self-
conception and an understanding of the social milieu in which the senior judiciary operate 
and interact,
198
 would support a conception of judicial political activity as involving what we 
might term ‘measured co-ordination’. This would seem to involve advanced notice of a 
planned speech or a brief word in a colleague’s ear, but likely little more. 
In closing, we can note criminal justice scholars’ alarm at the increasing centrality of 
prevention and public protection to sentencing policy and practice.
199
 The IPP sentence can 
be seen as one of various measures which evidence this ‘pre-emptive turn’ in sentencing 
policy,
200
 with state efforts increasingly directed at ‘fixing the future’ rather than punishing 
the past.
201
 For liberal legal scholars, these developments pose ‘challenges [to] major 
suppositions of legitimate criminalisation.’202 
The above case study to some extent supports Gearey et al.’s assertion that ‘the old 
stereotypes of a political quiescent or pro status quo judiciary’ have broken down over recent 
decades.
203
 However, we have seen that while the senior judiciary may be political actors, 
they operate within strict, and largely self-defined, boundaries. The case study presented 
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suggests that the judiciary’s rhetorical embrace of ‘the significant shift in the judge’s own 
understanding of the role that the judiciary plays in a democratic state’,204 but reluctance to 
pursue this to its substantive ends, is an artefact of the nature of the senior judicial tradition 
and inherent tensions within it. 
It is therefore concluded that in a political climate where insecurity and risk aversion 
have become pervasive and are increasingly instantiated in sentencing provisions,
205
 the 
dominant understanding of the senior judicial tradition leaves the British senior judiciary ill-
equipped robustly, and in their eyes legitimately, to contest particular instances of the ‘pre-
emptive turn’ in criminal justice. Of course, whether they should do so is another question 
entirely. 
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